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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, J 
Plaintiff-Respondent, i 
V • I 
JERRY LEE VELARDE, J 
Defendant-Appellant. i 
t Case No. 880211-CA 
i Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a denial of defendant's Motion to 
Withdraw a Guilty Plea to Attempted Mayhem,) a third-degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-105 (1978), in the 
Third Judicial District Court. This Court has jurisdiction to 
hear this appeal under Utah Code Ann. S 7842a-3f2)(f)(Supp. 
1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether this appeal is moot because defendant has 
served his sentence? 
2. Whether the trial court properly denied defendant's 
Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea finding that defendant did not 
show "good causeM for withdrawal? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-ll(e)(Supp. 1988)t 
The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty 
or no contest and shall not accept such a plea 
until the court has made the findings: 
(1) That if the defendant is not 
represented by counsel he has knowingly 
waived his right to counsel and does not 
desire counsel; 
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) That the defendant knows he has 
rights against compulsory self-incrimination, 
to a jury trial and to confront and cross-
examine in open court the witnesses against 
him, and that by entering the plea he waives 
all of those rights; 
(4) That the defendant understands the 
nature and elements of the offense to which 
he is entering the plea; that upon trial the 
prosecution would have the burden of proving 
each of those elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt; and that the plea is an admission of 
all those elements: 
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum 
and maximum sentence that may be imposed upon 
him for each offense to which a plea is 
entered, including the possibility of the 
imposition of consecutive sentences; and 
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result 
of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement 
and if so, what agreement has been reached. 
If it appears that the prosecuting 
attorney or any other party has agreed to 
request or recommend the acceptance of a plea 
to a less included offense, or the dismissal 
of other charges, the same shall be approved 
by the court. If recommendations as to 
sentence are allowed by the court, the court 
shall advise the defendant personally that 
any recommendation as to sentence is not 
binding on the court. 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-13-6 (1982)t 
Withdrawal of Plea. A plea of not guilty may 
be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
A plea of guilty or no contest may be 
withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with 
leave of court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Jerry Lee Velarde, was charged with Mayhem, 
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.S 76-5-105 
(1978). Defendant pled guilty to Attempted Mayhem, a third 
degree felony, on January 24, 1984, in the Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Jay E. 
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Banks, Judge, presiding. Defendant was sentenced by Judge Banks 
on January 30, 1984, to a term or zero to five years in the Utah 
State Prison to be served concurrently with defendant's previous 
conviction. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 30, 1983, defendant was arrested and charged 
with Mayhem, a second-degree felony (R. 3). The information 
alleged that defendant "jumped on the victim, Michael S. Terry, 
and bit off the upper portion of the victim's ear, completely 
tearing the upper portion away from the ear itself." (R. 11) (See 
Addendum MA"; Information). At the time of his arrest, defendant 
was on parole from the Utah State Prison for other felony crimes 
(R. 10). Following the arrest, defendant was returned to the 
Utah State Prison (R. 3). 
At a preliminary hearing on September 8, 1983, 
defendant waived a formal reading of the information (R. 4). The 
victim, Michael S. Terry, testified that as a result of the 
assault by defendant, the upper portion of his ear was 
dismembered (R. 5). Defendant was present during the victim's 
testimony (R. 5). Based upon the evidence adduced, Judge Michael 
Hutchings bound defendant over to the district court for trial 
(R. 4). 
Defendant was arraigned in the district court on 
September 30, 1983 (R. 12). A copy of the information was given 
to defendant and he entered a plea of "not guilty" to the Mayhem 
charge (R. 12). Defendant notified the ccjmrt that he intended to 
rely on the defense of insanity (R. 13). 
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On December 1, 1983, in a collateral case, defendant 
was convicted of second-degree murder, a first-degree felony, and 
was sentenced to a term or five years to life in the Utah State 
Prison (R. 40). 
On January 24, 1984, defendant entered a change of plea 
to the Mayhem charge (R. 16). At the change of plea proceeding, 
the information was read to the defendant and he entered a plea 
of "guilty" to Attempted Mayhem (R. 16) (See Addendum "B"; 
Transcript: Addendum "C"; Plea Affidavit). Judge Jay E. Banks 
sentenced defendant to a term of zero to five years in the Utah 
State Prison to run concurrently with defendant's second-degree 
murder conviction (R. 19-20). 
On appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, the second-degree 
murder conviction was reversed and defendant subsequently pled 
guilty to Manslaughter, a second-degree felony. (R. 89, p. 2). 
Defendant was sentenced to serve one to fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison for manslaughter (R. 89, p. 3). 
On August 31, 1987, three and one-half years after 
defendant entered his guilty plea, defendant filed a Motion to 
Withdraw his Guilty Plea to Attempted Mayhem (R. 25). After a 
hearing, Judge Raymond S. Uno denied the motion (R. 25, 89). 
Defendant's motion was denied a second time after an evidentiary 
hearing on February 8, 1988 (R. 26, 40). No witnesses were 
called at the evidentiary hearing. Id. Finally a hearing was held 
on September 12, 1988 to once again determine if defendant's plea 
was voluntary. (Transcript dated September 12, 1988). After 
hearing the arguments of the parties, Judge Uno denied 
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defendant's motion for the third time (R. 7^). Defendant now 
appeals the denial of his motion. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This appeal is moot since defendant has served his 
five-year sentence. Accordingly, this Court should not consider 
the merits of defendant's claims where no collateral consequences 
exist and defendant caused the matter to become moot through his 
failure to timely appeal. 
The trial court did not abuse it$ discretion in finding 
that defendant's guilty plea was voluntary and knowing where a 
copy of the information was read to defendant, he was present 
during preliminary hearing testimony of the victim, and he 
acknowledged his willingness to enter a voluntary guilty plea 
both orally and in writing by admitting the elements of the 
offense after consulting with his attorney. Further, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow defendant 
to withdraw his guilty plea based on defendant's alleged 
misunderstanding of the consequences of the guilty plea; namely, 
that his prior second-degree murder conviction could and would be 
reversed on appeal. The record clearly establishes that 
defendant understood the statutory sentence for the offense 
charged and that the trial court could impose the maximum 





BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE HAS BEEN SERVED, 
THIS APPEAL IS MOOT. 
Defendant pled guilty and was sentenced on January 24, 
1984 to serve not more than five years in the Utah State Prison. 
(See Addendum "BM; Transcript). Defendant's sentence was 
completed on January 24, 1989. Thus, defendant's appeal is now 
moot. 
The Utah Supreme Court has declined to consider appeals 
where the issues raised have become moot. In State v. Davis, 721 
P.2d 894, 895 (Utah 1986), the defendant appealed claiming his 
sentencing orders were invalid and requested that the case be 
remanded for resentencing. The Supreme Court held that the 
matter was moot since the defendant had served his sentence. Id. 
see also Richardson v. State, 402 N.E.2d 1012, 1013 (Ind. App. 
1980) (Appeal attacking sentence is moot where sentence has been 
completed). The Court said that "'[w]here the requested judicial 
relief can no longer affect the rights of the litigants, the case 
is moot and a court will normally refrain from adjudicating it on 
the merits.rM Ld. at 895, quoting, Spain v. Stewart, 639 P.2d 
166, 168 (Utah 1981). The Court noted an exception to the 
mootne8s doctrine where there is a Hcontinuing and recurring 
controversy." Davis at 895, citing, Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 
896 (Utah 1981). 
In Baker v. State, 240 Ga. 431, 241 S.E.2d 187 (1978), 
cert, denied, 439 U.S. 881 (1978) the Supreme Court of Georgia 
dismissed on appeal attacking the constitutionality of a criminal 
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statute where the issue had been rendered moot by the completion 
of the sentence. The Court observed that while an appellate 
court may exercise its discretion whether to decide a criminal 
case after the sentence has been served, it is not bound to do 
so. Ld. at 188, citing, Jacobs v. New York, 388 U.S. 431 (1967); 
Tannenbaum v. New York, 388 U.S. 439 (1967) reh'g. denied, 689 
U.S. 842 (1967). The Georgia Court chose nbt to reach the merits 
of the appeal "because the defendant has not demonstrated any 
efforts to expedite the appeal, preparation of record, etc., and 
has not shown, on this record, adverse collateral consequences 
. . .- Baker at 188 (citations omitted). 
In Holmes v. United States, 383 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 
1967) the court held that an appeal was moot where the sentence 
was served and there were no collateral disadvantages which 
appellant may incur as a result of the conviction. I_d. at 927. 
The Court found that where the defendant had been convicted of 
fourteen previous misdemeanor offenses, hi$ fifteenth misdemeanor 
I 
conviction did not create a collateral disadvantage. Id. 
In the present case, defendant was incarcerated at the 
I 
Utah State Prison for a second-degree murder conviction at the 
time of his guilty plea. Both the Homicide and Mayhem charge 
occurred while defendant was on parole from the Utah State Prison 
for other felony convictions (See Addendum "A"; Information). 
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Under these circumstances, it is apparent that no collateral 
consequences exist in light of defendant's previous felony 
convictions. 
Additionally, this Court should not exercise its 
discretion to decide a criminal case which has become moot as a 
result of defendant's own failure. As set forth above, Judge Uno 
denied defendant's first Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea on August 
31, 1987 (R. 25). Rather than pursue a direct appeal from the 
denial, defendant twice more requested that he be permitted to 
withdraw his plea (R. 26, 40, 77). Had defendant pursued an 
appeal from the first denial of his motion, his appeal would have 
been submitted to this Court prior to the termination of his 
sentence. Instead, defendant failed to expedite appellate review 
and the issue has now become moot. Therefore, this Court should 
not consider the merits of defendant's claims. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
HIS GUILTY PLEA. 
A. Defendant's Guilty Plea Was Knowingly, 
Intelligently, And Voluntarily Entered. 
Defendant claims that Judge Raymond S. Uno abused his 
discretion in denying his Motion to Withdraw his guilty plea. 
Defendant argues that his guilty plea was unknowing, involuntary 
It should be noted that if defendant is permitted to withdraw 
his plea, he will again face the original Mayhem charge, a 
second-degree felony, and if convicted, may be sentenced to serve 
one to fifteen years in prison, a term longer than he has already 
served and which may be imposed consecutive to his Manslaughter 
sentence. 
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and unintelligent because he did not understand the consequences 
of his guilty plea. Defendant's claim is wholly without merit. 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-13-6 (1982) provides that a plea of 
guilty may be withdrawn as follows: 
Withdrawal of plea. A plea of guilty may be 
withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. A 
plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn 
only upon good cause shown and with leave of 
court. 
Id. Accordingly, a criminal defendant may not withdraw a guilty 
plea as a matter of right, but only upon a showing of "good 
cause." State v. Plum, 14 Utah 2d 124, 378 P.2d 671 (1963); State 
v. Harris, 585 P.2d 450 (Utah 1978). A motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea is addressed to the trial court's discretion. State 
v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1977); State v. Garfield, 552 
P.2d 129 (Utah 1976). As in all discretionary matters afforded 
the trial judge's prerogatives as well as his advantaged 
position, reviewing courts accord considerable latitude to the 
trial judge's discretion and will not interfere "unless it 
plainly appears that there was abuse thereof," Forsyth, 560 P.2d 
at 339 (footnote omitted). 
In the instant case, defendant failed to establish 
below that his plea was unknowing, involuntary or unintelligent. 
In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), the United States 
Supreme Court held that it was reversible error for a trial court 
to accept a guilty plea without an affirmative showing in the 
record that it was made intelligently and voluntarily. In 
Boykin, the petitioner pled guilty to five indictments charging 
common law robbery and was sentenced to death. The -ludae asked 
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no questions of the defendant concerning his plea, and the 
defendant did not address the court. The Court stated: 
Several federal constitutional rights are 
involved in a waiver that takes place when a 
plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal 
trial. First, is the privilege against 
compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by 
the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the 
States by reason of the Fourteenth. . . . 
Second, is the right to trial by jury. . . . 
Third, is the right to confront one's 
accusers. We cannot presume a waiver of 
these three important federal rights from a 
silent record. 
Id. at 243 (citations omitted). As a result of Boykin, minimum 
requirements were established which a court must meet when a 
defendant enters a guilty plea. 
The United States Supreme Court in two decisions 
subsequent to Boykin further clarified the relationship between a 
knowingly and voluntarily entered plea and the defendant's 
constitutional rights. In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 
(1970), and North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), the 
Court, citing Boykin, upheld guilty pleas as voluntarily and 
intelligently made without any indication that specification of 
the Boykin trilogy of constitutional rights was required to be 
made at the time of the acceptance of the pleas. In clarifying 
Boykin, the Court stated: 
[T]he new element added in Boykin was the 
requirement that the record must 
affirmatively disclose that a defendant who 
pleaded guilty entered his plea 
understandingly and voluntarily. 
Brady, 397 U.S. at 747-48, fn. 4. The Brady court looked to the 
issue of voluntariness and intelligence of the person taking the 
plea without tying its analysis to the strictures of the Boykin 
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litany. The Court considered all relevant circumstances 
surrounding the guilty plea in order to determine its 
voluntariness. Likewise, in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 
25 (1970), the determination of whether a plea was made 
voluntarily and intelligently did not rest upon the structured 
questions of the Boykin litany, but rather upon the determination 
of -whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent 
choice among the alternative courses of action open to the 
defendant." Alford, 400 U.S. at 31. 
In addition, other courts have differed as to how 
strictly the Boykin standard must be followed in guilty plea 
proceedings. A majority of courts have held that as a matter of 
constitutional due process, a defendant's constitutional rights 
to a jury trial, confrontation, and protection against self-
expressly articulated 
the accused prior to 
incrimination need not be specifically and 
by the trial judge and expressly waived by 
the acceptance of the guilty plea. See e.g., Rouse v. Foster, 
672 P.2d 649, 651 (8th Cir. 1982); Neely vl Duckworth, 473 F. 
Supp. 288 (N.D. Ind. 1979); Wilkins v. Erickson, 505 F.2d 761 
(9th Cir. 1974); Stinson v. Turner, 473 F.£d 913, 915-16 (10th 
Cir. 1973); McChesney v. Henderson, 482 F.fid 1101, 1106-10 (5th 
Cir. 1973) cert, denied McChesney v. Henderson, 414 U.S. 1146 
(5th Cir, 1974); Wood v. Morris, 87 Wash. 2d 501, 554 P.2d 1032, 
1036 (1976); State v. Laurinof 106 Ariz. 586, 480 P.2d 342, 344 
(1971). 
In the instant case, the record is clear that 
defendant's guilty plea guilty plea was krjowingly, voluntarily 
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and intelligently entered in accordance with Boykin. At the 
January 24, 1984 guilty plea hearing, Judge Banks questioned 
defendant to determine whether defendant's guilty plea was made 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily (R. 88, p. 2-5) (See 
Addendum "B"; Transcript). The court asked defendant if he had 
reviewed his constitutional rights and the waiver thereof as set 
forth in defendant's affidavit. Ici. at 2 (See Addendum "C"; Plea 
Affidavit). The Plea Affidavit, signed by defendant, fully 
explains the underlying facts of the charge, the elements of the 
offense, the maximum sentence which may be imposed, and the full 
array of constitutional rights that are waived by a guilty plea. 
Id. Defendant indicated that he had reviewed his constitutional 
rights and understood the rights he was waiving (^ d-) Defendant 
was then afforded an opportunity to question the court about the 
waiver of his constitutional rights, which he declined. Id. 
When defendant was asked if there had been any promises 
made to induce his guilty plea, defendant answered in the 
negative. 2^ » a t 3. Defendant also denied the existence of any 
promises as to the sentence which may be imposed by the court and 
denied that any threat, duress, or any other undue influence was 
exerted on him to enter a guilty plea. Id. 
The Court explained to defendant that by entering a 
guilty plea to the Attempted Mayhem charge, the conviction would 
carry a sentence of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison 
and/or a fine not exceeding $5,000. Id. The Court then asked 
defendant whether he was under the influence of any drugs, 
narcotics, or alcoholic beverages or whether defendant had any 
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physical or mental disability that would interfere with his 
ability to freely enter a guilty plea. Id. at 3-4. Defendant 
responded in the negative. Id. 
The Court asked defendant how he pled to Attempted 
Mayhem, a third degree felony, occurring at 73 East 400 South, in 
Salt Lake County, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-105 
(1953, as amended), in that defendant attempted to commit mayhem 
upon Michael S. Terry by unlawfully and intentionally depriving 
Mr. Terry of a member of his body, to wit; an ear, and/or by 
unlawfully and intentionally slitting the £ar of Michael S. 
Terry. (R. 88. p. 4; Addendum "B"). Defendant responded, 
"guilty." Id. The Court then entered findings that defendant's 
guilty plea was "freely and voluntarily made." Id. 
Regardless of these facts, defendant asserts that his 
guilty plea was improperly entered because he did not understand 
the consequences of the guilty plea. As ^ully explained by the 
court, the direct consequences of defendant's guilty plea would 
be a prison sentence of zero to five yeark and/or a fine not 
exceeding $5,000. Jd. at 3. The Court explained to defendant 
that the Court may order the sentence to run consecutively or 
concurrently with a sentence the defendant was presently serving 
in the Utah State Prison Id. at 5. Defendant was given a 
concurrent sentence. Defendant knew and unequivocably accepted 
the fact that he would receive a sentence of not more than five 
years in the Utah State Prison for the Attempted Mayhem 
conviction. The legal consequences of defendant's guilty plea, 
as understood by defendant at the time he entered his guilty 
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plea, remained exactly the same regardless of the subsequent 
sentence reduction in defendant's collateral case and 
irrespective of a policy change of the Board of Pardons. The 
crux of defendant's present claim is that he did not know at the 
time of his plea to Attempted Mayhem that his second-degree 
murder conviction would be reduced to Manslaughter. Defendant's 
belated regret that he pled guilty to a reduced charge cannot be 
grounds for invalidating a voluntary, intelligent, and knowing 
guilty plea. 
Notably, defendant fails to cite any legal authority 
for his claim that the trial court erred in not informing him 
that a concurrent five to life sentence on an unrelated change 
may be reversed on appeal. See State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 
1344 (Utah 1984)(Appellant must support claim with relevant legal 
analysis and authority). Indeed, it appears to be a novel claim. 
However, to allow an unrelated and unpredictable future event to 
establish grounds to invalidate an otherwise knowing and 
voluntary guilty plea would be contrary to the public policy 
regarding the finality of criminal judgments. Cf. Codianna v. 
Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1105 (Utah 1983). 
B. Defendant's Guilty Plea Was Entered In Compliance 
With Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-ll(e)(Supp. 1988). 
Defendant avers to a policy change of the Board of Pardons in 
support of his claim that he did not understand the consequences 
of his guilty plea. (Brief of App. at p. 6). However, because 
defendant fails to identify the policy change or specify how it 
is relevant to his legal claim, respondent is without sufficient 
information to directly respond. See State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 
1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). In any event, a subsequent policy change 
of the Board of Pardons should not affect the voluntariness of a 
previously entered guilty plea. 
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1. The Gibbons Standard Does Not Apply To This Case. 
Defendant contends that his guiltV plea was taken in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-ll(e)(Supp. 1988). Defendant 
bases this claim on the application of State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 
1309 (Utah 1987) which provides for a strict reading of Rule 
11(e). However, defendant's application of the Gibbons standard 
in this case is misplaced. 
As this Court stated in State v. vasiiacopulos, 756 
P.2d 92 (Utah App. 1988) cert, denied Stat^ v. Vasiiacopulos, 765 
P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988): 
In the instant case, defendant entered his 
plea on February 17, 1984. Therefore, the 
strict Rule 11(e) compliance standard 
established under Gibbons in 1987 does not 
apply. See United States v. Johnson, 457 
U.S. 537 (1982); State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 
577 (Utah 1983) (when a new rule of criminal 
procedure constitutes a clear break with the 
past, it will not be applied retroactively). 
Rather, we will apply the Warner-Brooks test 
to determine whether the record as a whole 
affirmatively establishes defendant entered 
his plea with full knowledge and 
understanding of its consequences, namely the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive 
sentences. 
Vasiiacopulos, at 94. 
In the case at bar, defendant entered his guilty plea 
on January 24, 1984, three weeks before the defendant in 
Vasiiacopulos entered his plea. Thus, because defendant's plea 
was entered prior to Utah Supreme Court'^ 1987 decision in 
Gibbons, that case is not controlling in the present case and 
defendant'8 request to reconsider the retroactivity of Gibbons is 
unjustified. 
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2. Under the Warner-Brooks Test, Defendant's Plea 
Was Properly Entered. 
Defendant argues that even if Gibbons does not apply, 
the record below still establishes that Judge Uno abused his 
discretion in refusing to grant defendant's Motion to Withdraw 
his Guilty Plea. Defendant claims that the record establishes an 
abuse of discretion because Judge Banks failed to strictly adhere 
to the procedures outlined in Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-11(e)(Supp. 
1988). Rule 11(e) prescribes the procedures to be followed by a 
trial court in accepting a guilty plea: 
The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty 
or no contest and shall not accept such a plea 
until the court has made the findings: 
(1) That if the defendant is not 
represented by counsel he has knowingly 
waived his right to counsel and does not 
desire counsel; 
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) That the defendant knows he has 
rights against compulsory self-incrimination, 
to a jury trial and to confront and cross-
examine in open court the witnesses against 
him, and that by entering the plea he waives 
all of those rights; 
(4) That the defendant understands the 
nature and elements of the offense to which 
he is entering the plea; that upon trial the 
prosecution would have the burden of proving 
each of those elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt; and that the plea is an admission of 
all those elements: 
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum 
and maximum sentence that may be imposed upon 
him for each offense to which a plea is 
entered, including the possibility of the 
imposition of consecutive sentences; and 
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result 
of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement 
and if so, what agreement has been reached* 
If it appears that the prosecuting 
attorney or any other party has agreed to 
request or recommend the acceptance of a plea 
to a less included offense, or the dismissal 
of other charges, the same shall be approved 
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by the court. If recommendations &s to 
sentence are allowed by the court, the court 
shall advise the defendant personally that 
any recommendation as to sentence L^s not 
binding on the court. 
Specifically, defendant alleges tfyat Judge Banks failed 
to comply with three subsections of Rule 11(e): (1) that 
defendant was not informed of his constitutional rights and the 
waiver thereof as required by Rule 11(e)(3): (2) that defendant 
did not understand the nature and elements 0f the offense to 
which he was entering the plea as required ^y Rule 11(e)(4); and, 
(3) that defendant did not know the possibility of the imposition 
of a consecutive sentence as required by Rule 11(e)(5). 
As noted above, the Warner-Brooks standard governs the 
requirements of Rule 11(e) in this case. Warner v. Morris, 709 
P.2d 309 (Utah 1985); Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310 (Utah 1985). 
See also State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403 (Utah 1986). Under 
Warner-Brooks, the "record as a whole" standard is applied by the 
appellate court to determine whether the defendant entered his 
plea with full knowledge and understandinglof the offense of 
which he had been charged, its elements, axfid the nature of the 
sentence he may receive. 
In Warner & Brooks, the trial court failed to ask 
specifically if "he [defendant] was aware that he had a right 
against compulsory self-incrimination" Warber, 709 P.2d at 310. 
Despite the trial court's failure to address the issue, the 
Supreme Court stated "that the record as a whole affirmatively 
i 
establishes that defendant entered his plea with full knowledge 
and understanding of its consequences. . .1 . " Id. at 310. 
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In Miller, the defendant argued the trial court abused 
its discretion by refusing to allow him to withdraw his guilty 
plea since he did not understand the nature of the charges 
against him or the consequences of his plea. Miller, 718 P.2d at 
405. This Court found that although the trial court did not make 
a specific finding to this effect, "the absence of a finding 
under this section is not critical so long as the record as a 
whole affirmatively establishes that the defendant entered his 
plea with full knowledge and understanding of its consequences 
and of the rights he was waiving . . . .H Id. 
Miller# Warner and Brooks indicate that a trial court 
accepting a guilty plea is not constitutionally required to do 
all that Rule 11(e) lists. Constitutionally, all that is 
required is that the overall record discloses the defendant 
voluntarily and intelligently entered his guilty plea. 
In the instant case, the record as a whole establishes 
that defendant entered his guilty plea intelligently and 
voluntarily in accordance with S 77-35-ll(e). In particular, the 
record establishes that defendant understood the nature and 
elements of the offense to which he pled guilty and the 
relationship of the facts to the law as required by Rule 
11(e)(4). At the preliminary hearing on September 8, 1983, 
defendant waived a formal reading of the information (R. 4). The 
victim, Michael Steven Terry, testified twice about the assault 
(R. 4). During his second statement, Mr. Terry's testimony 
consisted of the fact that the upper part of his ear was missing 
(R. 5). Defendant was present during the testimony (R. 5). 
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Defendant was arraigned in the District Court on 
November 3, 1983 (R. 12). A copy of the information was handed 
to defendant and he entered a plea of Hnot guilty" to the Mayhem 
charge (R. 12). The probable cause statement in the information 
clearly sets forth the fact that defendant ^as charged with 
biting off the upper portion of Mr. Terry's ear (R. 11) (See 
Addendum "A"; Information). On January 24, 1984, defendant 
entered a plea of "guilty" to Attempted Mayhem. (R. 16). The 
following dialogue occurred at the change of plea hearing: 
The Court: Have you gone over ycfur constitutional 
rights and the waiver thereof as set forth lin vour affidavit? 
Mr. Velarde: Yes, sir. 
The Court: Any questions you woiild care to ask the 
Court with reference to your constitutional rights or the waiver 
thereor? 
Mr. Velarde: No, sir. 
The Court: Has there been any promises made to you to 
get you to enter a plea? 
Mr. Velarde: No, sir. 
The Court: Has there been any promises made as to what 
the Court would do on sentencing in this chse? 
Mr. Velarde: No, sir. 
The Court: By entering a plea to the included offense, 
that carries of sentence of zero to five years in the Utah State 
Penitentiary and/or a fine not to exceed $5,000. By entering a 
plea of guilty, you do, in fact, admit thd acts that support that 
charge. 
How old are you? 
Mr. Velarde: 28, sir. 
The Court: Do you read and write the English language? 
Mr. Velarde: Yes. 
The Court: Have ,ui« ^ ^ecute th^ affidavit. 
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Are you presently under the influence of any durge, 
narcotics or alcoholic beverages? 
Mr. Velarde: No, sir. 
The Court: Do you feel you have any physical or mental 
disability as such that interferes with your free choice to enter 
such a plea? 
Mr. Velarde: No, sir. 
The Court: Are you freely and voluntarily entering a 
plea of guilty at this time? 
Mr. Velarde: Yes. 
The Court: All right. To the included offense of 
attempted mayhem, a third-degree felony as I have described it to 
you, which occurred at 73 East 400 South, in Salt Lake County 
State of Utah, on or about March 4, 1983, In violation of Title 
76, Chapter 5, Section 102, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, in that you, Jerry Lee Velarde, attempted to commit 
Mayhem upon Michael S. Terry by unlawfully and intentionally 
depriving Michael S. Terry of a member of his body, to wit: an 
ear, and/or by unlawfully and intentionally slitting the ear of 
Michael S. Terry, whay now is your plea? Guilty or nor guilty? 
Mr. Velarde: Guilty. 
The Court: Plea of guilty is received, and the Court 
finds that is was freely and voluntarily made by the defendant, 
that he is not presently under the influence of any durgs, 
narcotics or alcoholic beverages, nor has a physical or mental 
disability as such that interferes with his free choice to enter 
such a plea. 
I base those findings on my observations of the 
defendant here in the courtroom, together with the questions that 
were put to him and his responses thereto. 
You have a right to be sentenced in not less than two 
no more than 30 days. What is your preference? 
Mr. Valdez: We would waive the minimum time, your 
honor, and ask you to sentence him today. 
The Court: You understand, by being sentenced today, I 
would commit you to the penitentiary? 
Mr. Velarde: Yes, sir. 
The Court: It is the judgment of the court that you be 
sentenced to — are you out at the penitentiary now? 
Mr. Velarde: Yes, I am. 
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The Court: I neglected to tell y6u, then — I wasn't 
aware of that — I can allow that to run consecutively or 
concurrently with the sentence you are presently serving out 
there• 
Do you understand that? 
Mr. Velarde: Yes. 
(R. 88; Addendum "A" at pp. 2-5) (emphasis added). 
As shown above, defendant clearly received "real notice 
of the true nature of the charge against him." Henderson v. 
Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 (1976). Furthermore, based upon the 
preliminary hearing testimony, defendant understood "the elements 
of the crimes charged and the relationship!of the law to the 
facts." Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312. 
The Plea Hearing Transcript and the Plea Affidavit also 
establish that defendant understood the constitutional rights he 
was waiving by means of entering a guilty (plea as reqired by Rule 
11(e)(3). Judge Banks asked defendant whether he understood his 
constitutional rights as explained in the Plea Affidavit 
(Addendum "A" at p. 2). The Plea Affidavit explains that a 
guilty plea is a waiver of the privilege Against self-
incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the right to 
confront his accusers (R. 16; Addendum MCf). Defendant 
acknowledged that he understood his rights. Id. 
Lastly, the record establishes that defendant 
understood the full legal consequences of his guilty plea as 
required by Rule 11(e)(5). As quoted abdve, Judge Banks 
explained to defendant that a guilty pled to the Attempted Mayhem 
charge would carry a maximum sentence of zero to five years 
and/or a fine of $5,000. ^ d. The Judge further explained that he 
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could order the sentences to run consecutively or concurrently 
with defendant's other sentence. j[d. at 5. Notably, the Judge 
ordered concurrent/ not consecutive sentences. Jd. at 5. 
Overwhelmingly, the trial record establishes that 
defendant understood the nature and elements of the charge, the 
constitutional rights waived by entering a plea of guilty, the 
maximum penalties which may be imposed, and the fact that the 
Judge may order the sentence to run concurrently or consecutively 
with defendant's other sentence. Thus, Judge Uno did not abuse 
his discretion in finding that defendant's plea was properly 
entered pursuant to Rule 11(e). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, respondent respectfully 
requests this Court to affirm the lower court's denial of 
defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. 
is DATED th / A—-—rlay of February, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
• _ ^5 SC-. S^f^g^^ 
DAN R. LARSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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THE STATE OF UTAH 
VS. 
JERKY LEE VELARDE 
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unaer oath states on information and Deliet that the detendant(s) 
committed the crimes ot: 
MAYHEM, a becond Degree Felony, at 73 East 40U South, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, on or about March 4, 1983, 
"Tn violation of Title 76,Chapter £, Section 105, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that the defendant, 
JERRY LEE VELARDE, a party to the offense, committed 
mayhem upon Michael S. Terry by unlawfully and intention-
Q ally depriving Michael S, Terry of a member of his body, 
towit: an ear, and/or by unlawfully and intentionally 
suttiny the ear of Michael S. Terry; 
I 
NO bAIL REQULST: The defendant, JERRY LEE VELARDE, is cur-
rently on parole from the Utah State Prison for other felony 
crimes, Theretore, pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Utah 
Constitution, it is requested that the defendant be held 
without bail on the above charge. 
This intormation is based 
on evidence obtained trom 
the following witnesses: 
Coraon Parks 
Sgt« Mike Fierro 
Michael b. Terry 
James S. Holm 
Subscribed and sworn to me 
this 22nd day ot August 
19 83 •' 
^ ^ Qji^o 
Judge 
Authorized tor presentmeryc afnd tiling: 
'M^L 
COUNTY ATTORNEY 
DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY 
INFORMATION 
State vs. JERRY LEE VELARDE 
County Attorney # 83-1-60402 
Paye Two 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: The affiant, a Salt Lake City 
Police Detective, bases this on the following: 
His reading ot report # 83-1-7321, which states that, at 
the above time, date and location, the defendant, Jerry Lee 
Velarae, jumped on the victim, Michaei S. Terry, and bit off 
the upper portion of the victim's ear, completely tearing the 
upper portion away from the ear itself. 
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CASE NO. CR-83-1219 
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
TAKEN AT: METROPOLITAN HALL OF JUSTICE; SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
APPEARANCES: 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH: 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
ERNIE JONES 
DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY 
JAMES VALDEZ, ESQ. 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER'S 
ASSOCIATION 
DATE: JANUARY 2k, 198U 
Robyn Haynle 
Haynlc & Snider 
817 Lake Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801) 531-6116 
1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; TUESDAY, JANUARY 24, 1984 
2 9:30 A.M. 
3 I —OO0OO--
4 
5 1 THE COURT: JERRY LEE VELARDE? 
* MR. VALDEZ: THAT'S MY MATTER, YOUR HONOR. THAT 
7 IS SET FOR A CHANGE OF PLEA. 
8 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. WHAT IS THE ANTICIPATED 
9 PLEA? 
10 MR. VALDEZ: PLEA TO A THIRD DEGREE, ATTEMPTED. 
11 THE COURT: ATTEMPTED MAYHEM? THIRD DEGREE, 
12 ATTEMPED MAYHEM? 
13 IS YOUR TRUE AND CORRECT NAME JERRY LEE VELARDE? 
14 MR. VELARDE: YES, SIR. 
15 THE COURT: HAVE YOU GONE OVER YOUR 
16 I CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THE WAIVER THEREOF AS SET FORTH IN 
17 YOUR AFFIDAVIT? 
18 MR. VELARDE: YES, SIR. 
19 THE COURT: DO YOU UNDERSTAND THOSE RIGHTS THAT 
20 YOU ARE WAIVING? 
21 MR. VELARDE: YES, SIR. 
22 THE COURT: ANY QUESTIONS YOU WOULD CARE TO ASK 
23 THE COURT WITH REFERENCE TO YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OR THE 
24 WAIVER THEREOF? 


























THE COURT: HAS THERE BEEN ANY PROMISES MADE TO 
YOU TO GET YOU TO ENTER A PLEA? 
MR. VELARDE: NO, SIR. 
THE COURT: HAS THERE BEEN ANY PROMISES MADE AS 
TO WHAT THE COURT WOULD DO ON SENTENCING IN THIS CASE? 
MR. VELARDE: NO, SIR. 
THE COURT: HAS THERE BEEN ANY THREATS, DURESS OR 
ANY OTHER UNDUE INFLUENCE EXERTED ON YOU TO GET YOU TO ENTER 
A PLEA? 
MR. VELARDE: NO, SIR. 
THE COURT: BY ENTERING A PLEA TO THE INCLUDED 
OFFENSE, THAT CARRIES A SENTENCE OF ZERO TO FIVE YEARS IN 
THE UTAH STATE PENITENTIARY AND/OR A FINE NOT TO EXCEED 
$5,000. BY ENTERING A PLEA OF GUILTY, YOU DO, IN FACT, ADMIT 
THE ACTS THAT SUPPORT THAT CHARGE. 
HOW OLD ARE YOU? 
MR. VELARDE: 28, SIR. 
THE COURT: DO YOU REAP AND WRITE THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE? 
MR. VELARDE: YES. 
THE COURT: HAVE HIM EXECUTE THE AFFIDAVIT. 
ARE YOU PRESENTLY UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ANY 
DRUGS, NARCOTICS OR ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES? 
MR. VELARDE: NO, SIR. 
THE COURT: DO YOU FEEL YOU HAVE ANY PHYSICAL OR 
1| MENTAL DISABILITY AS SUCH THAT INTE»PPD.ES WITH YOUR FREE 
2 CHOICE TO ENTER SUCH A PLEA? 
31 MR. VELARDE: NO, SIR. 
4 1 THE COURT: ARE YOU FRfiELY AND VOLUNTARILY 
5 ENTERING A PLEA OF GUILTY AT THIS tlME? 
6\ MR. VELARDE: YES. 
7 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. TO THE INCLUDED OFFENSE 
8 1 OF ATTEMPTED MAYHEM, A THIRD-DEGREE FELONY AS I HAVE 
9 DESCRIBED IT TO YOU, WHICH OCCURRED AT 73 EAST «f0 0 SOUTH, IN 
10 SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, ON OR ABOUT MARCH H, 1983, 
11 IN VIOLATION OF TITLE 76, CHAPTER 5, SECTION 105, UTAH CODE 
I i 
12 ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED, IN THAT YOU, JERRY LEE VELARDE, 
13 ATTEMPTED TO COMMIT MAYHEM UPON MltHAEL S. TERRY BY 
U I UNLAWFULLY AND INTENTIONALLY DEPRIVING MICHAEL S. TERRY OF A 
15 MEMBER OF HIS BODY, TO WIT: AN EAR, AND/OR BY UNLAWFULLY AND 
16 INTENTIONALLY SLITTING THE EAR OF MICHAEL S. TERRY, WHAT NOW 
17 IS YOUR PLEA? GUILTY OR NOT GUILTff? 
18 MR. VELARDE: GUILTY. 
1* THE COURT: PLEA OF GUjILTY IS RECEIVED, AND THE 
20 COURT FINDS THAT IT WAS FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY MADE BY THE 
21 DEFENDANT, THAT HE IS NOT PRESENTLY UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
22 ANY DRUGS, NARCOTICS OR ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES, NOR HAS A 
23 PHYSICAL OR MENTAL DISABILITY AS SUCH THAT INTERFERES WITH 
24 1 HIS FREE CHOICE TO ENTER SUCH A P1JEA. 
25 I BASE THOSE FINDINGS ON MY OBSERVATIONS OF THE 
DEFENDANT HERE IN THE COURTROOM, TOGETHER WITH THE QUESTIONS 
THAT WERE PUT TO HIM AND HIS RESPONSES THERETO. 
YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO BE SENTENCED IN NOT LESS THAN 
TWO NOR MORE THAN 3 0 DAYS. WHAT IS YOUR PREFERENCE? 
MR. VALDEZ: WE WOULD l^ AIVE THE MINIMUM TIME, 
YOUR HONOR, AND ASK YOU SENTENCE HIM TODAY. 
THE COURT: YOU UNDERSTAND, BY BEING SENTENCED 
TODAY, I WOULD COMMIT YOU TO THE FJENITENTIARY? 
MR. VELARDE: YES, SIR. 
THE COURT: IT IS THE I JUDGMENT OF THE COURT THAT 
YOU BE SENTENCED TO -- ARE YOU OUf AT THE PENITENTIARY NOW? 
MR. VELARDE: YES, I AM. 
THE COURT: I NEGLECTJED TO TELL YOU, THEN -- I 
WASN'T AWARE OF THAT — I CAN ALLOW THAT TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY 
OR CONCURRENTLY WITH THE SENTENCE^ YOU ARE PRESENTLY SERVING 
OUT THERE. 
DO YOU UNDERSTAND TH^T? 
MR. VELARDE: YES. 
THE COURT: WHAT AREl YOU SERVING OUT THERE? 
MR. VELARDE: FIVE Tb LIFE. 
THE COURT: IT WILL RUN CONCURRENTLY. I WILL 
SENTENCE YOU TO ZERO TO FIVE YEARS IN THE UTAH STATE 
PENITENTIARY. COMMITMENT WILL ISSUE FORTHWITH, AND 1 WILL 
ALLOW IT TO RUN CONCURRENTLY WITH THE FIVE TO LIFE SENTENCE 
YOU ARE PRESENTLY SERVING. 



























I, ROBYN HAYNIE, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE 
FOREGOING PAGES 2 THROUGH 5, INCLUSIVE, COMPRISE A 
FULL, TRUE AND.CORRECT TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
HAD UPON THE HEARING OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER ON 
JANUARY 24, 1984, AND THAT SAID TRANSCRIPT CONTAINS 
ALL OF THE EVIDENCE, ALL OF THE OBJECTIONS OF COUNSEL 
AND RULINGS OF THE COURT, AND ALL MATTERS TO WHICH THE 
SAME RELATE. 
DATED THIS 12TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 1988. 
ROBYN HAYNIE, CSR/RPR 
ADDENDUM C 
At aST&torUi Court o f the Third Judic ia l " — J A N 2 4 ^ 4 
Sta te o f U t a h 
Affidavit of Defendant 
Criminal No. 
under oath, hereby Acknowledge that I have entered a plea of 




I have received a copy of the charge (Jnformati/nj) and understa crime I am pleading guilty to is a 
Class of Mtsdemea 
/ZiAo */& ^"f 
fine, or both both.J am not on drugs oralcphc 
5 
(Degree of Felony 
and understand the punishment for this crime may be 
prison term.. 
My plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily made. I am represented by Attorney 
who has explained my rights to me and I understand them. 
1. I know that I have a constitutional right to plead not guilty and to have a jury trial upon the charge to which I 
have entered a plea of guilty, or to a trial by a judge should I desire. 
2. I know that if I wish to have a trial. I have a right to see and hear the witnesses against me in open court in my 
presence and before the Judge and jury with the right to have those witnesses cross examined by my attorney. I also 
know that I have a right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at state expense to testify in court upon my behalf and 
that I could testify on my own behalf, and that if I choose not to do so. the jury will be told that this may not be held 
against me. 
3. I know that if i were to have a trial that the prosecutor must prove each and every element of the crime charged 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that any verdict rendered by a jury whether it be that of guilty or not guilty must be by a 
complete agreement of all jurors. 
4. I know that under the constitution that I have a right not to give evidence against myself and that this means that 
I cannot be compelled to admit that I have committed any crime and cannot be compelled to testify unless 1 choose 
to do so. 
5. I know that under the constitution of Utah that if I were tried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge that I 
would have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of Utah for review of the trial 
proceedings and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, that those costs would be paid by the 
State without cost to me. 
6. ! know and understand that by entering a plea of guilty ! am giving up my constitutional rights as set out in th< 
preceeding paragraphs and that I am admitting I am guilty of the crime to which my plea of guilty is entered 
7. I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon another offense of which I have beet 
convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences beinj 
imposed on me. 
(» ; ) ' . ) 
or sentence or imprisonment upon me and no promises have been made to me by anyone as to what the sentence win 
be. 
9. No promises or threats of any kind have been made to induce me to plead guilty. The following other charges 
pending against me. to-wtt (Court^se^numberfs) or count(s)): 
i 
will be dismissed, and that no other charge(s) will be Hied against me for other crimes I may have committed which 
are now known to the prosecuting attorney. ! am also aware that any charge or sentencing concessions or 
recommendations or probation or suspended sentences, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing made 
or sought by either defense counsel or counsel for the State, is not binding On the Judge and may not be approved by 
the Judge. 
10 I h^ve read this Affidavit, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, andlknow and understand its contents. I 
am O^Q years of age. have attended school through the z£ and I can read and 
understand the English language. 
Dated this £ _ Z day of 
Subscribed and sworn to before me in Court this 
h ? d*JL. Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY: y
 y * 
I certify that I am the attorney for v Jc/tA+4 £ALZ<£A*&<1^*
 % the defendant named above and I know he 
has read the Affidavit, or that I have read it to4iim. and I discussed it with him and believe he fully understands the 
meaning of its contents and is mentally and phyMcally competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief the statements, 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing Affidavit are in all respects accurate and true. 
Defense Attoftfty 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTOR 
•Mt^ 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in its case a g a i n s t T _ _ ^ _ -y • defendant. 
I have reviewed the Affidavit of the defendant and find that the declarations are/pue and accurate No improper 
inducements, threats, or coercions to encourage a plea have been offered the defendant. There is reasonable cause to 
believe the evidence would support the conviction of the defendant for the plea offered, and that acceptance of the plea 
would serve the public interest. """* 7 
•••£. yj'/CK. tjfttisy 
Prosecuting Attorney 
ORDER V 
Baved upon the Tacts vet forth in the foregoing Affidavit and certification, the Court finds the defendant's plea of 
guilty is freely and voluntarily made and it is ordered that defendant's plea of "Guilty" to the charge, set forth in the 
Affidavit be accepted and entered. ^Q ^* 
Done in Court thiy X */ day of (J\%y^y , 19 £jL. 
R DIXON HINDLEY W *>/?// 
• » — f y f - f f f r ' V l / / * Distnct Judge 
0 tfcpgfcCfcr* 0 0 0 0 
